tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post1117232535519608082..comments2023-11-29T18:53:19.500+00:00Comments on Reading The Summa: Question 40 - The Persons in Comparison to the RelationsGregory the Eremitehttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11652447286252910371noreply@blogger.comBlogger42125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-66468838644227162262015-03-27T20:33:47.851+00:002015-03-27T20:33:47.851+00:00I don't think we're going to come to agree...I don't think we're going to come to agreement about the extent to which logical distinctions are really only in the mind in all cases, not to mention that this entire argument isn't really about the Trinity but about the coherence of divine simplicity with a number of traditional theistic propositions like divine free will, I think I will leave the discussion to Gregory or anyone else who wants to comment.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-27600958992464451232015-03-27T20:33:02.713+00:002015-03-27T20:33:02.713+00:00K:
If you insist on this, I don't see much p...K:<br /><br /><i> If you insist on this, I don't see much point in continuing. It certainly is not an issue of semantics.</i><br /><br />My point is that Aquinas uses a variety of terms to refer to the will, i.e. act, power, operation. Changing the term does not seem to change the argument itself, but if you think it does, then please show me how.<br /><br /><i> As I think the argument from 1.27 argued, the idea is that logical distinctions, as he says "So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds" give rise (without the connotation of time) to a distinction in action that is internal to the divine essence.</i><br /><br />I think that you are saying that there is a logical distinction between the intellect and the will. In that case, the intellect <i>is</i> the will, which means that whatever the intellect does, the will does, because they are one and the same. Imagine saying that John <i>is</i> Mr. Smith, but John is jumping right now while Mr. Smith is sitting down. That is impossible, if John is identical to Mr. Smith. Whatever John does, Mr. Smith does, and vice versa. Similarly with the divine intellect and the divine will. It makes no sense to say that they are one and the same in reality, but the intellect does something the will does not, because that would mean that they are really distinct and not just logically distinct. <br /><br /><i> Of course that raises the question of question of whether why we should stop at two, but I think 1.27.5 gives at least a plausible reason, that will and intellect are the only operations that are purely internal</i><br /><br />My argument only requires that there are two, and the question is whether the distinction between the two is real or logical.<br /><br /><i>Do you mean "divine simplicity is coherent"? "True" makes it seem as though you believed God existed (though I'm not sure what you propose can really be called God).</i><br /><br />I mean that I happen to agree that the ultimate ground or principle of the contingent universe must be simple. Whether you want to call it “God” is up to you. I certainly wouldn’t, as it does not have all the features of the Judeo-Christian-Muslim deity. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-70900299751483298042015-03-27T19:02:21.961+00:002015-03-27T19:02:21.961+00:00The reply fails, because Aquinas refuses to consid...The reply fails, because Aquinas refuses to consider the possibility that the order that he refers to is itself a byproduct of our human understanding. He often makes the argument that our human understanding forces us to consider divine attributes (or operations) in some way, but that this has no bearing upon the reality of God, and is simply a projection of our minds that do not correspond to God’s being at all. For example, he writes at QDP 1.1 that we say that “the divine operation comes from the divine essence”, which makes a distinction in our minds between the divine essence and the divine operation, but in reality, this “kind of relation is logical”, meaning that in reality, the divine essence <i>is</i> the divine operation, and they are one and the same. <br /><br />So, why not make the same reply to the order between the processions of intellect and will? Reason dictates that the intellect <i>is</i> the will, meaning the actions of the intellect are identical to the actions of the will, and thus it is impossible that the intellect does X and the will does not do X. In reality, if the intellect does X, then the will does X, and vice versa, because they are the same thing! Therefore, even if our minds can’t help but conceive of there being a distinction between the processions of intellect and will, by virtue of our reasoning about the divine attributes, we must conclude that the distinction itself is logical and not real.<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-41517859646694270132015-03-27T19:02:16.850+00:002015-03-27T19:02:16.850+00:00K:
It does not follow that, if there were only o...K:<br /><br /><i> It does not follow that, if there were only one single activity of the divine essence, that that would mean the the Father was equal to the Son.</i><br /><br />Aquinas argues that the Son is a procession of the divine intellect and the Spirit is a procession of the divine will at ST 1.27.5, which means that the only way for there to be really distinct processions is if the divine intellect is really distinct from the divine will. However, the divine intellect is <i>not</i> really distinct from the divine will, and they are, in reality, one and the same thing, meaning that any differences between the two are exclusively derived from our limited understanding. In other words, the activity of the divine intellect <i>is</i> the activity of the divine will, which means that the procession of the divine intellect <i>is</i> the procession of the divine will, and it therefore follows that the Son <i>is</i> the Spirit.<br /><br /><i>The existence of an internal procession at all means we already have a real distinction that does not effect the divine essence because it is an act of the divine essence.</i><br /><br />Aquinas writes that “God's action is not distinct from His power, for both are His divine essence” (ST 1.25.1). In other words, there is no real distinction between the divine essence and “an act of the divine essence”. They are one and the same thing.<br /><br /><i> Though I honestly doubt that that is going to convince you, since you seem to be thoroughly committed to the idea that it is impossible for the divine persons to be really distinct from each other in a way that does not involve a distinction in the divine essence. Maybe Gregory can at least point out where you have misread Aquinas, though it seems even that would be optimistic.</i><br /><br />You are correct that I’m not convinced by his reply to the objection. He writes:<br /><br />“Though will and intellect are not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order.”<br /><br />He clearly admits that there is no real distinction between the intellect and the will in God, meaning that they are one and the same thing in reality, and any distinction between them is simply a byproduct of our limited human understanding and comprehension. He says later in the reply that “in God the will and the intellect are the same”. He then describes that the processions that are derived from intellect and will must “exist in a certain order”. That order is that in order to love X, the intellect must first understand X as lovable. That is what he means when he writes that “love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect”. <br /><br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-77799404861500026792015-03-27T18:35:14.898+00:002015-03-27T18:35:14.898+00:00"But Aquinas certainly does talk about the wi..."But Aquinas certainly does talk about the will, at least, as an operation (SCG 1.73.4). Personally, I think this is just an issue of semantics."<br /><br />If you insist on this, I don't see much point in continuing. It certainly is not an issue of semantics.<br /><br />"But the reality is that these issues are peripheral to the issue at hand, which is whether the divine attributes (or operations, if you like) are really distinct or logically distinct."<br /><br />As I think the argument from 1.27 argued, the idea is that logical distinctions, as he says "So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds" give rise (without the connotation of time) to a distinction in action that is internal to the divine essence. Of course that raises the question of question of whether why we should stop at two, but I think 1.27.5 gives at least a plausible reason, that will and intellect are the only operations that are purely internal. I admit this might seem to admit composition, but I at least think its worth more consideration, as you seem to have barely mentioned 1.27 in your argument here or the book length ones in the comment boxes on Feser's blog. <br /><br />"Hence, I still believe that divine simplicity is true, but that the consequences of divine simplicity certainly compromise the Trinity, and also compromise other traditional features of God."<br /><br />Do you mean "divine simplicity is coherent"? "True" makes it seem as though you believed God existed (though I'm not sure what you propose can really be called God). You might be interested in work of Michael Almeida who seems to hold something sort of similar to that, but bases it on Multiverse theory.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-41187574252296158362015-03-27T16:01:42.442+00:002015-03-27T16:01:42.442+00:00Sorry for doing this again, but I have a better re...Sorry for doing this again, but I have a better response.<br /><br />"But if that is true, then it would follow that there is but one single activity of the divine essence, which cannot be parsed into different operations. In other words, the operation of the divine intellect is the operation of the divine will, because they are one and the same in reality, and only distinguished in our minds. But if that’s true, then the processions derived from each divine attribute are also one and the same, which means that the Father is the Son, because they are ultimately one and the same procession derived from one and the same source or origin. Clearly, this must be rejected, because it would destroy the Trinity altogether, which means that there must be a real distinction between the divine attributes, and Aquinas is simply wrong here."<br /><br />It does not follow that, if there were only one single activity of the divine essence, that that would mean the the Father was equal to the Son. The existence of an internal procession <i>at all</i> means we already have a real distinction that does not effect the divine essence because it is an act of the divine essence.<br /><br />I think the idea you are talking about, though, is at least partially addressed in ST 1.27.3<br /><br /><i>Objection 3. Further, if any other procession but the intelligible procession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the procession of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a procession is identified with the intelligible procession of the intellect, inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect (19, 1). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the procession of the Word. <br /><br />Reply to Objection 3. Though will and intellect are not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order. For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the procession of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the substance of the intellect and its concept are the same; so, although in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the concept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the procession of the Word in God.</i><br /><br />Though I honestly doubt that that is going to convince you, since you seem to be thoroughly committed to the idea that it is impossible for the divine persons to be really distinct from each other in a way that does not involve a distinction in the divine essence. Maybe Gregory can at least point out where you have misread Aquinas, though it seems even that would be optimistic.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-51825157629109966632015-03-27T15:13:10.580+00:002015-03-27T15:13:10.580+00:00But the reality is that these issues are periphera...But the reality is that these issues are peripheral to the issue at hand, which is whether the divine attributes (or operations, if you like) are really distinct or logically distinct. If the former, then God himself is undermined. If the latter, then the Trinity is undermined. Of the two options, the latter seems more preferable, because even if the Trinity is false, one can still preserve the divinity and existence of God. If the former is upheld as true, then not only is the Trinity falsified, but the existence and reality of God, as well.<br /><br /><i>If that's the case, your issue is not that you reject the Trinity (though that is obvious, since you're an atheist) but you think divine simplicity is incoherent, period. In which case, this whole discussion is absolutely meaningless and should be about something altogether different.</i><br /><br />I am fine with divine simplicity itself, but I think that it compromises some traditional features of God. For example, if divine simplicity is true, then all divine activity is necessary, which negates God’s freedom to have done otherwise, as I argued above. However, God can still have intellect, will, power, etc., except that these are all ultimately one and the same thing, such that any distinction between them is exclusively a byproduct of our mental comprehension of the divine, and do not actually correspond to anything really distinct in the divine itself. I am also fine with the idea that these attributes (or operations) themselves are composed of some kind of multiplicity (e.g. multiple divine ideas in the intellect, multiple objects of the will, multiple operations of the power, etc.), but that this multiplicity must be devoid of passive potency, for example. Hence, I still believe that divine simplicity is true, but that the consequences of divine simplicity certainly compromise the Trinity, and also compromise other traditional features of God.<br /><br />I do not believe that God could have done otherwise than he did in creating the universe, for reasons that I’ve mentioned above. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-51570109288598052872015-03-27T15:12:59.592+00:002015-03-27T15:12:59.592+00:00K:
Where is it said that the intellect and will ...K:<br /><br /><i> Where is it said that the intellect and will are attributes and not operations?</i><br /><br />Feser: “… though we distinguish in thought between God’s eternity, power, goodness, <i>intellect</i>, <i>will</i>, and so forth, in God himself there is no distinction between any of the divine <i>attributes</i>” (Aquinas, p. 127). But Aquinas certainly does talk about the will, at least, as an operation (SCG 1.73.4). Personally, I think this is just an issue of semantics.<br /><br /><i>Even if they are both identical to the divine essence, does Aquinas say that they cannot result in different actions? I'm not asking what you think, I already know you think they can't, I'm asking if you can point to Aquinas saying so, since the whole point of your argument is to prove that he was a Sabellian in spite of himself.</i><br /><br />The question is whether the <i>implication</i> of his position is in accordance with my claims, and not what he himself thought. I highly doubt that Aquinas would countenance any interpretation of his position that resulted in a heretical outcome, but that is irrelevant to whether his position <i>does</i>, in fact, result in a heretical conclusion. <br /><br />I think that Aquinas would endorse the position that there is a single divine act, but that it is a multifaceted activity with distinct components, so to speak. But then you have to determine whether the distinct components are really distinct or only logically distinct. If the former, then my argument above holds, i.e. that Being itself would be really distinct from the other divine attributes (or operations, if you like), which means that it is logically possible for some divine attributes not to exist at all, and puts them in a dependent position vis-à-vis Being itself, which is absurd. If the latter, then any distinction between the different components of the single divine act are mere byproducts of our mental comprehension and not actually present in the divine act itself, meaning that there is actually just a single act, which would nullify the Trinity as a mental construct and not corresponding to anything real. <br /><br /><i> If this was the case, it would not be possible for us to exist in the first place, for God could only do one thing. So if divine simplicity is true, it must be possible that God can act in different ways, or He could not have created a diverse world.</i><br /><br />Those are two separate issues. There is a difference between saying (a) God could have created a different universe, and (b) God could create a universe that includes multiplicity within it. Certainly, both (a) and (b) are compromised by divine simplicity. <br /><br />(a) is compromised, because if there is no difference between the divine power to do X and the divine actually doing X, which is a consequence of divine simplicity, then there is only a single divine activity that God can possibly do. There is simply no possible way that God could do otherwise. How could he?<br /><br />(b) is compromised, because the multiplicity in the universe must correspond in some way to a multiplicity in God himself, such as a multiplicity of divine ideas that serve as archetypes and templates for the multiplicity in the universe. But then by admitting multiplicity in God, one seems to compromise the absolute unity of God, and admit some kind of composition into divinity. This has been a concern since antiquity that was best elucidated by the Neoplatonists who were forced to postulate Intellect as the source of multiplicity to avoid saying the One is the source of multiplicity, but then where did the multiplicity of the Intellect come from if not from the One? dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-16449873193974943602015-03-27T13:10:59.824+00:002015-03-27T13:10:59.824+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-54180313252012666552015-03-27T13:04:22.421+00:002015-03-27T13:04:22.421+00:00This comment has been removed by the author.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-48423608163430079522015-03-26T17:24:50.209+00:002015-03-26T17:24:50.209+00:00So, one is stuck with a conundrum. Either the dist...So, one is stuck with a conundrum. Either the distinction between the divine attributes is real or logical, there being no alternative option. If the distinction is real, then a number of absurdities follow, which would compromise the very notion of God himself. If the distinction is logical, then the Trinity is impossible. Thus, one seems to have to choose with abandoning the Trinity or God himself. <br /><br />Any thoughts?<br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-71036349294850581072015-03-26T17:24:46.029+00:002015-03-26T17:24:46.029+00:00So, either the distinction between the divine attr...So, either the distinction between the divine attributes is real or notional. Aquinas clearly states that the distinction between them is only notional. He writes: “As therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood.” In other words, “He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, as things represent Him” (ST 1.13.4). That means that any distinction between the divine attributes is <i>exclusively</i> in our conception of God by virtue of the multiplicity inherent in our intellectual operations themselves, and <i>not</i> in God himself. In reality, “as His intellect is His own existence, so is His will”, and that his will “is not distinct from His essence” (ST 1.19.1). <br /><br />But if that is true, then it would follow that there is but one single activity of the divine essence, which cannot be parsed into different operations. In other words, the operation of the divine intellect <i>is</i> the operation of the divine will, because they are one and the same in reality, and only distinguished in our minds. But if that’s true, then the <i>processions</i> derived from each divine attribute are also one and the same, which means that the Father <i>is</i> the Son, because they are ultimately one and the same procession derived from one and the same source or origin. Clearly, this must be rejected, because it would destroy the Trinity altogether, which means that there must be a real distinction between the divine attributes, and Aquinas is simply wrong here.<br /><br />But Garrigou-Lagrange says that it is impossible for there to be a real distinction between the divine attributes, because this position “is opposed to God's absolute simplicity; for, as the Council of Florence says: "In God all things are one and the same where there is no relation of opposition."” (The One God, 3.3). There seems to be a concern that admitting real distinction into the divine essence somehow compromises simplicity. Both Aquinas and Garrigou-Lagrange are sufficiently concerned to avoid this conclusion, but I’m not too sure why. After all, Aquinas has no problem with the divine intellect having a multitude of objects and the divine will having a multitude of objects, saying that neither impacts divine simplicity (see SCG 1.77.4). So, if a real multiplicity of objects of divine attributes is no problem, then why should there be a problem with a real multiplicity of divine attributes? <br /><br />One problem that I can see is that if there is a real distinction between the divine attributes, then there would be a real distinction between Being itself (being a divine attribute) and the other divine attributes (e.g. essence, intellect, will, justice, mercy, etc.). But in that case, the very existence of the divine attributes would be dependent upon Being itself, because only Being itself necessarily exists. The divine attributes would have no inherent tendency towards existence, but their reality would be utterly dependent upon Being itself, which would actually make them <i>creatures</i>, as Aquinas argues at ST 1.28.2. Furthermore, it would no longer be necessary for God to have all the divine attributes at all. There could be a God without justice, or mercy, or an intellect, or a will, or even an essence! Any one of them may not even exist at all, since they are all distinct in reality from reality itself. dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-83437382132950389212015-03-26T17:24:22.399+00:002015-03-26T17:24:22.399+00:00K:
If "What the divine persons have in commo...K:<br /><br /><i>If "What the divine persons have in common cannot be identical to what the divine persons do not have in common" is true, then we can say that what distinguishes the divine persons is the processions of the divine essence, which, as it is not a "thing" but eternal inward act, as in ST 1.27, which cannot be a is not a creature.</i><br /><br />I don’t think that will work. Compare you and me. We have some commonalities and some distinctions. We share being a human being in common, and we differ in terms of our respective memories, for example. Neither our being a human being nor our having different memories are “things” per se, although they are both <i>something</i>, i.e. an actuality of some kind. So, I don’t see why the principle of distinction must be a “thing” at all, and not just <i>something</i> that is present in X that is absent in Y. <br /><br /><i>I think then he would object that the way processions are laid out in 1.27 is wrong, because he believes (I have seen him say elsewhere) that the divine intellect and the divine will are the same thing, since they are both equivalent to the divine essence, and so could not derive distinct processions, but here he is confusing intellect and will as attributes when they are operations. If God's simplicity meant he could only manifest himself simply, He would not have been able to create a diverse world.</i><br /><br />I’ve read different opinions on this matter. <br /><br />On the one hand, Edward Feser, for example, argues that the divine will <i>is</i> the divine intellect: “Talking or conceiving of God, God’s essence, God’s existence, God’s power, God’s goodness, and so forth are really all just different ways of talking or conceiving of one and the very same thing. Though we distinguish between them in thought, there is no distinction at all between them in reality” (Aquinas, p. 127). <br /><br />On the other hand, Garrigou-Lagrange, for example, says that there is a <i>virtual</i> distinction between the divine attributes, such as the divine intellect and the divine will, meaning that although one can say that the divine intellect knows, one cannot say that the divine will knows. He says that a virtual distinction is a distinction that is “founded on reality”, but is also “non-existent previous to the mind's consideration” (The One God, 3.3). I’ll confess that I actually have no idea what this is supposed to mean. Maybe you’ll have more luck than I.<br /><br />Now, if Feser is correct, then whatever one predicates of one divine attribute, one can also predicate of any other divine attribute, because they are ultimately “one and the very same thing”. If that is true, then I fail to see how one and the same thing can result in different processions. In other words, if the divine intellect <i>is</i> the divine will, then whatever the divine intellect does, the divine will does, as well, which means that they cannot have really different processions or emanations. In reality, there is only a <i>single</i> procession that our minds conceive of as distinct in some way. <br /><br />If you reject Feser’s position, and embrace Garrigou-Lagrange’s, i.e. that there <i>is</i> a distinction of some kind between the divine attributes, such that they <i>can</i> have different operations and processions, then it becomes necessary to <i>characterize</i> this distinction somehow. In Aquinas, there are only two distinctions: logical (or notional) and real. A logical distinction is a distinction that <i>only</i> exists in the mind, and a real distinction is a distinction that does <i>not</i> only exist in the mind, i.e. it <i>also</i> exists in reality. These are mutually exclusive kinds, such that negating the one necessarily implies the other. There is no <i>middle</i> ground between them, which means that the virtual distinction is impossible, and any appeal to it is logically incoherent. <br />dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-6813202998889203022015-03-26T12:44:47.947+00:002015-03-26T12:44:47.947+00:00"He goes further: it is not just that we have..."He goes further: it is not just that we have to talk of God through analogies but that we must also acknowledge that our being and the being of God are themselves analogical in reality. Created beings are fundamentally composites – of matter and form (for material being), of essence and existence, and most fundamentally of actuality and potentiality (for all created being). When you’re trying to formulate an argument about the reality of completely simple being, you have to be aware of this and of its consequences. You can only hope to be not wrong; you cannot hope to have arrived at comprehension of your subject."<br /><br />The problem for me is that what I think is being proposed here is a flat out contradiction---elsewhere, he has said:<br /><br />"And I'm sure someone could drive themselves dizzy with confusion trying to contemplate a square circle, but that is only because one is trying to comprehend something that is logically impossible, which results in mental gridlock and collapse. That is not a sign that there is something superbly profound behind the concept, but rather that the concept itself is <i>empty</i>."<br /><br />That really stuck with me. I couldn't shake the feeling that maybe we really are trying to square the circle. And even though I think I've got the solution (the processions, eternal acts, which can't be creatures), I feel like I'm perched over the edge of a part precipice of arguments and counterarguments that stretches on without an end. I feel like I just want it to go away.<br /><br />Anyway, forgive my rant. And thank you for your kind response.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-28640599789163053392015-03-26T11:55:01.356+00:002015-03-26T11:55:01.356+00:00I do have some holiday coming up soon; one of the ...I do have some holiday coming up soon; one of the things I have promised myself is to come back to this discussion! I don’t really want to discuss dguller’s position without him being present, but I do think that his arguments are re-expressions of counter-arguments that Aquinas was well aware of in formulating his doctrine. <br /><br />If you were spiritually shaken by these arguments, step back for a minute and remember what Aquinas is trying to do in the section of the summa devoted to the Trinity and note how different it is from what he argues for in the opening questions. In this treatise on the one God, Aquinas argues that the existence of God is knowable with certainty from reason. He goes further in arguing that we can have certain knowledge of some things that must be true of God in a negative sense (that He is altogether simple, for example) and also in a positive sense (that He is Love, for example). In discussing facts about God, Aquinas is careful to point out that our language about God is a language of analogy; we are creatures whose vocabulary, as it were, is drawn from created reality. When we talk about uncreated reality, we have to use concepts and language that are derived from created reality. We have to be extremely careful about how we reason with these concepts when we talk about God, as they may not behave in the way that we expect them to! Fortunately, revelation is available to guide us in this process.<br /><br />He goes further: it is not just that we have to talk of God through analogies but that we must also acknowledge that our being and the being of God are themselves analogical in reality. Created beings are fundamentally composites – of matter and form (for material being), of essence and existence, and most fundamentally of actuality and potentiality (for all created being). When you’re trying to formulate an argument about the reality of completely simple being, you have to be aware of this and of its consequences. You can only hope to be not wrong; you cannot hope to have arrived at comprehension of your subject.<br /><br />When Aquinas turns to talk about the Trinity he immediately acknowledges that the Trinity is a truth of revelation; you cannot infer the triune nature of God by natural reason. You can only hope to formulate expressions about it that are self-coherent. To do this, you have to formulate a beginning to a metaphysics of absolutely simple being; and you have to do this with only one example and with only the data contained within the sources of revelation in front of you. To do this, you’re going to have to come up with new metaphysical notions. For example, Aquinas introduces the fundamental notion of “transcendental multiplicity” that applies (uniquely) to the Godhead. We’re used to the idea of the holistic unity of something corresponding to the transcendental notion of “one”; we’ve now got to get used to the idea of transcendental multiplicity, presumably convertible with all the other transcendentals in the usual way, in which the transcendental “one” is not seen as a part or sub-division of the transcendental “three”. And we’ve got to do this after having thrown away many of our usual ways of reasoning because they don’t survive the process of analogy.<br /><br />Anyway, more later.<br />Gregory the Eremitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11652447286252910371noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-16011846836998286102015-03-26T10:04:30.012+00:002015-03-26T10:04:30.012+00:00I'd also point out that he does some quote min...I'd also point out that he does some quote mining on several occasions, for example, he says that Aquinas says, "The only way that they differ is in their “mode of intelligibility” (ST 1.28.2) or “in our way of thinking” (ST 1.39.1), which is the definition of a notional distinction." But the the first quote certainly does not imply "our minds" as dguller thinks it does, but the intelligibility of the Word discussed in 1.27. And the quote from 1.39 is in fact, "But relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom really, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an opposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that opposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons." You can in particular see in this latter quote that Aquinas is deliberately eschewing the merely notational relations he is imputing to him.<br /><br />I know you must have like a million things to do, so forgive me for harping on this. I felt quite spiritually shaken by this argument, and I wish there were a more thorough refutation of it.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-31464833951583099572015-03-23T08:45:11.029+00:002015-03-23T08:45:11.029+00:00Do you think this would work?
If "What the ...Do you think this would work? <br /><br />If "What the divine persons have in common cannot be identical to what the divine persons do not have in common" is true, then we can say that what distinguishes the divine persons is the processions of the divine essence, which, as it is not a "thing" but eternal inward act, as in ST 1.27, which cannot be a is not a creature.<br /><br />dguller has said elsewhere:<br /><br />"Just to be clear, it really doesn’t matter for my argument whether the principle of distinction is the different origins, the different processions, the different relations, or whatever. You can just say that whatever distinguishes the divine persons from one another is X, and therefore, if my argument is correct, it necessarily follows that X is a creature. The absurdity still follows."<br /><br />But I don't think it follows in the case of processions, because they are not "things" so they could not be creatures.<br /><br />I think then he would object that the way processions are laid out in 1.27 is wrong, because he believes (I have seen him say elsewhere) that the divine intellect and the divine will are the same thing, since they are both equivalent to the divine essence, and so could not derive distinct processions, but here he is confusing intellect and will as attributes when they are operations. If God's simplicity meant he could only manifest himself simply, He would not have been able to create a diverse world.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-4169229631069800382015-03-22T14:20:59.132+00:002015-03-22T14:20:59.132+00:00Oh, and thank you for responding. I really almost ...Oh, and thank you for responding. I really almost thought I would never get a response for this, and here I had one in only a few hours.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-49181803170435979792015-03-22T14:15:14.500+00:002015-03-22T14:15:14.500+00:00I think there may be a solution his objections in ...I think there may be a solution his objections in ST. 1.27. Though just trying to wrap my head around anything anyone says in this debate practically makes me nauseous, so I almost hope the debate doesn't continue.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-55856975847042226352015-03-22T08:02:52.089+00:002015-03-22T08:02:52.089+00:00Unfortunately, as you may be able to infer from th...Unfortunately, as you may be able to infer from the lack of new material on these pages over the last year, dguller's interesting intervention came just at a point when my other commitments (especially work) were beginning to take up all the hours of the week!<br /><br />I do hope to return to this discussion at some point, so keep tuned in!<br />Gregory the Eremitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11652447286252910371noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-56077722084720262042015-03-22T04:04:30.115+00:002015-03-22T04:04:30.115+00:00I would be very interested to see this discussion ...I would be very interested to see this discussion continued, especially the notion that dguller is "badly misreading Aquinas in these sections, especially in not seeing that your counter-arguments were obvious to Aquinas." I have seen him defend this position on other boards, but it usually seems to come down to a shouting match, with both sides simply repeating the same assertions over and over again for what amounts to a novel-length mountain of posts with lines of discussion that are hard to follow.K.C.https://www.blogger.com/profile/16615328866645036838noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-50130931398500438902014-01-04T01:52:42.481+00:002014-01-04T01:52:42.481+00:00No problem, Gregory. Take your time.
Here's a...No problem, Gregory. Take your time.<br /><br />Here's a simpler version of my argument:<br /><br />(1) C is a principle of unity between A and B iff A and B share C in common iff C is present in A and C is present in B <br />(2) C is a principle of distinction between A and B iff A and B do not share C in common iff C is present in A and C is absent in B<br />(3) A principle of unity between A and B cannot be identical to a principle of distinction between A and B<br />(4) The divine persons share being God (= the divine essence = Being Itself) in common<br />(5) Therefore, being God (= the divine essence = Being Itself) is a principle of unity between the divine persons (by (1), (4))<br />(6) Therefore, being God (= the divine essence = Being Itself) cannot be identical to a principle of distinction between the divine persons (by (3), (5))<br />(7) If A is not identical to being God (= the divine essence = Being Itself), then A is a creature<br />(8) Therefore, a principle of distinction between the divine persons is a creature (by (6), (7))<br /><br />You clearly want to reject (8), because it violates core theological truths, and so you must reject one or more of the premises. Which will you reject? You cannot reject (1) or (2), because those are just definitions of what a principle of unity and a principle of distinction are. You cannot reject (3), because that would result in a logical contradiction, i.e. what A and B have in common is identical to what A and B do not have in common. You cannot reject (4), because the divine persons share being God in common. And you cannot reject (7), because it is true that if something is not God, then it is a creature.<br /><br />I really don't know what you would do, but I look forward to your response.dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-74428823298356476632013-12-31T12:09:22.490+00:002013-12-31T12:09:22.490+00:00Back at last; but I’m afraid that I am probably go...Back at last; but I’m afraid that I am probably going to disappoint you – at least temporarily.<br /><br />I must admit that I’m finding corresponding in the reply boxes to blog posts to be very frustrating; especially to a discussion so interesting and detailed as this one. For your last series of four blog post, for example, I find myself wishing to comment in detail on most lines! It is precisely the detail (and it is important detail) that gets lost in this type of medium. I think you are badly misreading Aquinas in these sections, especially in not seeing that your counter-arguments were obvious to Aquinas. But to justify this bold assertion I need to go into greater depth than this medium supports.<br /><br />I have been planning for quite some time to add an independent website to this blog; one component of this will be a proper discussion forum where we can better lay out these arguments. In addition this will be much more amenable to conversations in which there are more than two voices. So, if you will have patience with me, I will transfer this thread to the new forum and perhaps we can start anew? I hope this will be done within the next three months.<br />Gregory the Eremitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11652447286252910371noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-88793195762592845662013-12-14T16:15:31.407+00:002013-12-14T16:15:31.407+00:00Very busy at the moment with professional life! I ...Very busy at the moment with professional life! I hope to get back to you some time over the Xmas break.<br />Gregory the Eremitehttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11652447286252910371noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2129086278343859186.post-60837903376635937262013-12-09T21:27:56.405+00:002013-12-09T21:27:56.405+00:00Gregory:
Any further comments?Gregory:<br /><br />Any further comments?dgullerhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14647381896282400404noreply@blogger.com